Le Haaretz publie le rapport d’une interview d’un conseiller de l’ex Ministre de la Défense Peretz, Haggai Alon, qui suivi celui-ci au cours de la dernière guerre. Très critique envers les FDI, il souligne notamment la déconnexion entre les FDI et le pouvoir civil.
You enter the sanctuary of the Israeli defense establishment and discover a vacant place. There is no in-depth discussion, people are afraid to talk and all positions are coordinated ahead of time in backrooms.
Il présente une situation ou le CEMAT, le général Dan Halutz, souhaite obtenir une liberté d’action totale pour conduire le conflit et ou le Ministre de la Défense peine à suivre l’évolution des débats sur la stratégie générale d’Israël dans le cadre de la guerre. L’accent est mis sur la volonté des FDI de tourner le MD, voir tout simplement de la manipuler, de manière prendre en charge la conduite du conflit. Il mentionne à ce titre la création d’un conseil improvisé au cours de la guerre, qui regroupe militaires, diplomates et responsable des services de sécurité (Shin Bet), au bénéfice du MD.
[Peretz], who came from a civilian background, had a hard time checking the preparatory work and the facts the army presented him. Maj. Gen. (res.) Uri Saguy, a former OC Northern Command, chief of MI and a veteran fighter, agreed to help Amir. He reviewed the plans the army presented and more than once suggested canceling them. It was clear to us that senior officers were presenting plans that bore a hint of imagination and daring, but did not have any rationale or operational purpose, and that the army was not really intending to implement them. They forced Amir to reject them, and immediately leaked to the press that the minister was refusing to let the Israel Defense Forces win.
Defense Ministry and IDF officials supported the idea [d’une escalade avec la Syrie en vu de forcer celle-ci à s’impliquer ouvertement dans le conflit] and there was an understanding that it should be carefully considered together with the Foreign Ministry and the National Security Council. Halutz refused to even raise the matter for discussion. Because of Halutz’s opposition and the political echelon’s fears, including the PM’s, of clashing with the chief of staff, even any thought of reviewing the plan unofficially with the Americans was rejected outright.
Il souligne, sans malheureusement s’étendre sur le sujet, le pouvoir des industries de Défense israéliennes.
By chance I discovered that the power of the defense industries is the strongest in the defense establishment.
Le responsable des questions de Défense du Haaretz rapporte les propos du patron du Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin. Il insiste sur les points suivants:
- La trêve négociée avec le Hamas bénéficie avant tout au Hamas.
In agreeing to the cease-fire, Diskin believes, Israel extended a lifeline to Hamas. « We are not attacking them and we have lifted the blockade, while they have not taken upon themselves a commitment to stop their arms buildup. From the point of view of Hamas, it is the winner in the conflict, as the side that managed to hold its ground during the Israeli blockade. The lull in fighting is depicted as an impressive achievement for it. » For its part, Israel is getting a temporary calm but, he says, « this is in fact an illusion. In our assessment, the rocket firing will start again at some point in the future. »
- L’image de puissance, le moyen de la dissuasion israélienne, n’a de cesse d’être battu en brèche depuis 2005.
In general, Diskin says, « our situation is extremely problematic in the struggle against radical Islam. » He mentions a series of events in the past three years: the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ gaining of control of the government in Gaza, the Second Lebanon War, and now the cease-fire. « The events of the past three years have been a real blow to Israel’s deterrent ability. Since Hamas came to power, the level of Palestinian daring against us has risen. That is the result of the erosion of our status.
- Le conflit avec la Hamas est total, et il n’y a pas d’espoirs que cela puisse changer, à court ou à long terme.
Hamas has no intention of becoming more flexible about long-term issues vis-a-vis Israel, the Shin Bet head believes. Any flexibility it shows will be tactical. « For them the entire area of the Land of Israel is waqf [holy Muslim] land. In the future, they want to set up an Islamic caliphate here. From their point of view, it is a zero-sum game – them or us. A religious movement doesn’t change its ideology.
- Une nouvelle confrontation avec le Hezbollah n’est qu’une question de temps.et sera vraisemblablement d’importance. Dans l’immédiat, la faiblesse de la position politique du Premier Ministre ne permet pas d’engager de telles opérations militaires.
One senior officer says that it is clear that in the next round, ground forces will be employed « so as to take a maximum number of civilians out of the range of the Katyushas, » but that such a move would not be the way to win the battle. « We must not discount the short-range rockets but we must also not exaggerate. A great deal depends on how well we know how to protect ourselves and on responsible behavior on the home front. In the end, the real result will depend on something else – on our ability to deter the other side and to create destruction there on a scope that will force them to stop. » Another senior officer, from the field corps, touches on a sensitive spot: « It is easy to say that next time we’ll send in the ground forces, » he says. « What is not mentioned is the price. A government that decides on a move like that has to know that it will entail the loss of many soldiers’ lives. Even after what we experienced in Lebanon, I can’t see a government in Israel today making a decision of that kind without hesitating over the matter for a few days.